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Backwards Explanation and Unification 
Abstract: It is an open question whether we ever successfully explain 
earlier states by appealing to later ones, and, further, whether this is even 
possible. Typically, these two questions are answered in the same way: if  
we give and accept ‘backward explanations,’ they must be possible; if  they 
are impossible, we are right to reject them. I argue that backwards 
explanations are brittle—they fail if  the future event does not occur—and 
this is part of  the reason they are not accepted about the actual world. 
This does not mean, however, that they must be rejected entirely. I argue 
that backwards explanations are possible for certain systems. This shields 
unificationism about scientific explanation from some recent criticisms. 
1. The Questions of Backwards Explanation 
Can anything be explained by appealing to something that is temporally later? There 
are two related issues. First, are these ‘backwards explanations’ given and accepted? Second, 
could they ever be successful, and under what conditions? Giving answers to these questions 
shows us some constraints on theories of  explanation. 
Jenkins and Nolan (2008), for instance, answer both questions affirmatively, arguing 
that backwards explanations are common. By contrast, Woodward (2003) should be seen as 
arguing that the answer to both questions is ‘no.’ Woodward claims that backwards 
explanations are neither given nor accepted about the world we live in. There are two ways 
of  understanding this argument: it might be trading on our explanatory intuitions about the 
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actual world or our explanatory intuitions more generally. In either case, I argue, Woodward 
is pushed to make the strong claim that backwards explanations are in principle unsuccessful, 
that is, that they are never acceptable for any sort of  system. 
There are real consequences to this rejection of  backwards explanation: Woodward 
has argued from the fact that unificationism does not rule out backwards explanations for 
certain systems to the conclusion that it is a non-starter as a theory of  scientific explanation. 
Instead, he claims, a theory of  explanation must countenance only explanations that run the 
same direction as causation within the system that they are about. Woodward’s concerns 
about unificationism are caught up in his views about causation, but the argument against 
unificationism rests on claims about explanation more generally. But it seems too quick to 
reject unificationism about scientific explanation and draw conclusions about causation on 
the basis of  a tendentious claim about backwards explanations. 
I will argue that the two questions of  backwards explanation should be answered ‘no’ 
and ‘yes,’ respectively: we do indeed reject backwards explanations of  phenomena in the 
world in which we live, but backwards explanations can still be successful for certain sorts of  
systems, namely systems genuinely indifferent to the direction of  time. This counts in favor 
of  unificationism, as unificationism can accommodate the fact that backwards explanations 
are not given or accepted about the actual world but still potentially successful for some 
systems. 
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2. Backwards Explanations Not Common 
Using temporally subsequent states to explain temporally prior ones is to offer a 
‘backwards explanation.’ Jenkins and Nolan (2008) argue that we regularly give and accept 
backwards explanations. One key case they consider is the scarlet pimpernel: the scarlet 
pimpernel is a flower that closes its petals before it rains. Thus, Jenkins and Nolan say, it is 
reasonable to explain the closing of  the pedals in terms of  the future rain. 
(1) “Its flowers are closing because it is going to rain.” (2008: 109) 
This is, they say, a successful case of  explanation wherein the explanandum is 
temporally prior to the explanans. They find other, similar patterns of  explanation (2008: 
104): 
(2) “I’m tidying my flat today because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow.” 
(3) “The planet is slowing down because it is going to reach its apogee soon.” 
(4) “The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon.” 
Jenkins and Nolan argue that it is not possible to reinterpret all of  these cases as 
explanations of  later states in terms of  prior ones. They claim it is inappropriate to recast 
the pimpernel explanation, which was originally given in terms of  future rain, in terms of  
the mechanisms that cause the pimpernel to close in response to changes in lighting. They 
take it that the person offering the explanation will often be ignorant that it is indeed 
changes in lighting that prompt the pimpernel to close. They say that it is problematic to 
systematically attribute to an explainer claims about mechanisms unknown to the explainer 
(2008: 108). 
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Byerly (2012) disagrees, citing the standard philosophical practice of  reinterpreting a 
speaker’s meaning, even in accordance with theories that they do not know of  or endorse. 
Byerly cites Merricks (2001) as a key example; Merricks maintains both a minimal ontology 
and the truth of  the statements about objects by re-interpreting claims about X’s (tables, 
chairs, planets, etc.) in terms of  ‘simples arranged X-wise.’ Byerly claims that we can 
reinterpret backwards explanations in whatever way we see fit because we have a legitimate 
philosophical practice that allows such reinterpreting. 
But Byerly’s exoneration of  extreme reinterpretation is too quick. Merricks’s 
interpretational scheme is supposed to be neutral (in some sense) with respect to the 
content; it is simple mechanical substitution, replacing every instance of  ‘table’ with ‘simples 
arranged table-wise,’ etc. Merricks’s scheme is only plausible if  it does not really change what 
is said. If  the speaker did not grant that the table just is some simples arranged table-wise, it 
would be inappropriate to reinterpret their speech in this way. Indeed, on Merricks’s own 
view, talk of  ‘persons’ cannot be reinterpreted as talk about ‘simples arranged person-wise,’ 
because persons are something over and above the collection of  simples that make them up. 
So while we can reinterpret explanations, we cannot change what is said too much. In 
the case of  explanation, substituting mechanism talk for future event talk is a substantive 
change: one can believe that the claim about the future is explanatory while rejecting any 
description of  the mechanism actuates the event—or even rejecting mechanisms entirely! 
Thus the substitution seems to go too far. But there are some cases where we would want to 
reinterpret a speakers claim about future events explaining present ones. Cases where charity 
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requires it, for instance. Consider the following case, where Annalise and Beatriz discuss the 
pimpernel: 
A: Its flowers are closing because it’s going to rain. 
B: But it’s not going to rain. 
If  Beatriz is right and we take Annalise’s claim at face value, Annalise has failed to 
explain the pimpernel’s is closing. Annalise’s explanation appeals to a future state of  affairs 
that will not come to pass, and while we might want to allow for some cases of  false 
statements explaining, Annalise’s appeal does not seem to explain. This suggests that 
backwards explanations only succeed when the future state they appeal to will actually occur.  
We can protect seemingly backwards explanations from failing this condition by 
recasting them in terms of  present circumstances rather than future ones, though. Take, for 
instance, this plausible extension of  the scenario: 
A: Its flowers are closing because it’s going to rain. 
B: But it’s not going to rain. 
A: Yes, but the pimpernel thinks it’s going to rain. 
Annalise recasts her initial explanation, saying that what she should have said is that 
its flowers are closing because the pimpernel expects rain. This is a way of  reinterpreting 
Annalise’s initial claim in a way that does minimal violence to it while still shifting it from a 
backwards explanation to a forwards one. We should see Annalise as offering (1A) from the 
beginning: 
(1A) Its flowers are closing because it thinks it’s going to rain. 
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Jenkins and Nolan claim that there is no reason to see this forwards explanation as 
the ‘real’ explanation (106). But the brittleness of  backwards explanations does give us a 
reason: we can make these explanations more robust in light of  uncertainty about the future 
by recasting them in terms of  present expectations. Nothing in the present expectation of  a 
future event depends on that future event’s being actual, so the explanation can succeed even 
if  that event does not come to pass. By shifting the claims about the future behind the 
propositional-attitude indicator, we have successfully dispensed with the need for the future 
state to be actual. The flat-tidying case can be dealt with similarly: 
(2A) I’m tidying my flat today because I believe my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. 
The cases are still different, though: we might be unhappy letting the intentional 
explanation stand in the pimpernel case. Because we think pimpernels are not intentional 
systems, we might want to reduce the ‘thinks’ talk to mechanism talk. That we are willing to 
accept one intentional explanation but not the other reflects our desire for explanations to 
match the systems they are given about, that is, only attribute systematic features to those 
systems that they actually have.  
In this case, the intentional explanation ‘matches’ the system that it is about in the 
flat tidying case, because I am an intentional system. The intentional explanation does not 
match the system it is about in the pimpernel case, because the pimpernel is not. We can 
allow that I think, but claiming that the pimpernel thinks seems problematically false. 
Whatever else these explanations claim about the systems involved, true or false, they only 
seem acceptable when they appropriately take account of  certain key characteristics of  that 
system. 
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We might, then, end up recasting the intention talk in the pimpernel case as 
mechanism talk. Notice that it is only this last reframing that falls afoul of  Jenkins and 
Nolan’s objection. The issue they identify does not arise when we replace the appeals to 
future states with appeals to present ones; it only arises when we recast intention talk in 
terms of  mechanisms, as it is only this last reframing that is not plausibly available to 
Annalise. Thus the problem is not with replacing talk of  future states with present ones but 
with replacing intention talk with mechanism talk. As such it is a problem for the theorist of  
mind, not the theorist of  explanation. 
Regardless of  whether we remove the intention talk or not in these cases, making 
them explicitly intentional made them significantly more robust and did so without falling 
afoul of  Jenkins and Nolan’s worries. 
It would seem that some cases of  backwards explanation cannot be dispensed with 
in this way, though. Cases that do not involve agents (or pseudo-agents) responding to the 
environment cannot be recast in these terms without changing what is meant too much. 
Cases like (3) “the planet is slowing down because it will reach its apogee soon” and (4) “the 
volcano is smoking because it will erupt soon” show that recasting all backwards 
explanations as intentional will not work. 
As Jenkins and Nolan note, both of  these cases depend on a regularity between what 
is happening now and what will happen in the future; the speaker appeals to some 
phenomenon regularly connected but temporally subsequent to the explanandum as 
explanatory of  it. It appears the bare regularity is responsible for the explanation’s success, 
and this essentially requires an appeal to a future state. 
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The volcano case is still brittle, though: if  the volcano does not in fact erupt, its 
(future) erupting cannot explain its (present) smoking. And this shows that even regularity 
explanations require the future to cooperate. But they do seem to leave open the possibility 
of  genuine backwards explanation, when the future does indeed conform to our expectation. 
This leads to a puzzle, though. An explanation, seemingly, should succeed or fail when it is 
given, not in light of  what eventually occurs. This feature of  explanation is part of  what 
made the pimpernel case so clear cut. Beatriz denied right then that the future event would 
occur, updating the context so as to make conversational moves that depended on that claim 
unwarranted. Beatriz’s claim narrows the range of  possible explanations by explicitly 
excluding all appeals to that particular future event. It also seems to implicitly narrow the 
range of  possible explanation schema to those which do not rely on any future event, 
because it makes the epistemic risk associated with any backwards explanation real. This 
implicit updating reinforces my claim that genuinely backwards explanations are avoided, 
when possible, because they are brittle. 
This line of  reasoning also explains why the denial that the planet will reach its 
apogee does not seem to undercut the explanation offered: the regularity between the 
planet’s slowing and its approaching its apogee is so tight as to be nearly necessary. Even if  
something were to keep the planet from reaching apogee, the explanation still seems 
successful. Note that this non-brittle backwards explanation is strange in light of  the others. 
That the apogee explanation does not fail when the claim about the future is false is not 
good reason to think that there are cases of  backwards explanation that do not fail when 
their claims about the future are false. Rather, it is reason to see the apogee case as a-typical 
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of  backwards explanation. This is because it is not a case of  backwards explanation at all. To 
see why, consider the following two versions of  the explanation:  
(3) “The planet is slowing down because it is going to reach its apogee soon.” 
(3A) “The planet is slowing down because it is approaching its apogee.” 
To most readers, these two explanations say the same thing; their content is the same 
in most conversational contexts. Further, if  a speaker believes (3), they almost certainly 
believe (3A). This means we can unproblematically substitute (3A) for (3) in almost all 
conversational contexts. Our unwillingness to reject (3) when confronted with its falsity, 
then, almost certainly stems from the fact that we read it as actually asserting (3A). Note that 
(3A) is a forwards explanation, and it is still true even if  the planet never reaches apogee. 
This leaves only the volcano case, which relies fundamentally on a regularity (so 
resists reformulation) but is still brittle. Jenkins and Nolan consider recasting regularity 
explanations like this as calling on present dispositions instead of  future events, changing (4) 
into (4A): 
(4) “The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon.” 
(4A) “The volcano is smoking because it is disposed to erupt.”  
They reject this substitution because the reformulation offered is strictly speaking 
stronger than the explanation it replaces. But this is exactly what we are looking for: if  we 
understand the original explanation as genuinely making a claim about the future, then it is 
brittle. In order to make these explanations more robust in the face of  uncertainty about that 
future, we do indeed want a stronger claim than the original explanation made. Their 
considerations do not give a reason to reject the reformulation in terms of  dispositions but 
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rather to accept it. Alternatively, we might think that people commonly use locutions like (4) 
to mean (4A). If  that is the case here, then there is no problem in making the substitution. 
One might worry that this is like recasting the pimpernel explanation with 
mechanisms: the person offering (4) might have no knowledge of  the particular properties 
that underwrite the disposition named in (4A). This worry is erroneous. The explainer need 
not have any particular knowledge about these dispositions in order to name them by their 
most common, most important effect. The volcano explanation can be unproblematically 
recast as appealing to dispositions. 
On the other hand, one might worry that someone who understands a system well 
can know that some future event will happen, making a backwards explanation based on that 
knowledge successful. Consider a trained volcanologist: when the volcanologist has 
appropriate information, it would seem that they know the volcano will erupt and can use 
this as a way of  explaining the present behavior of  the volcano. But note that even Jenkins 
and Nolan allow recasting experts as offering forwards explanations; they objected to 
reinterpreting non-expert speakers who are ignorant of  the underlying mechanisms as if  
they were experts. Here, the speaker’s knowledge of  the mechanisms involved underwrites 
both the claim about the future and the claim about the link between the present event and 
the future one. For experts, their knowledge of  the underlying features of  the system are the 
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root of  both the predictive claim and the explanatory one, so the explanation can be easily 
understood as going from temporally earlier to later.  1
The brittleness of  backwards explanations pushes us to reframe them as forwards 
explanations. Responsiveness is explained intentionally, and bare regularities are explained 
with dispositions. Jenkins and Nolan’s cases can all be recast as forwards explanation without 
doing violence to the claims made. This leads to the conclusion that backwards explanations 
are not common, though superficially backwards explanations surely are. We can make sense 
of  more of  our explanatory practices—namely that backwards explanations are brittle and 
that explanations succeed and fail when given—by understanding them as forwards 
explanations, and charity often requires this. 
3. The Argument Against Any Backwards Explanation 
Jenkins and Nolan fail to give any convincing cases of  backwards explanation. This 
suggests that the right answer to ‘Are backwards explanations actually given and accepted?’ is 
‘No.’ Seeing that backwards explanations are not accepted in our every day lives, Woodward 
makes the broader claim that backwards explanations violate some intuition we have about 
the nature of  explanation. In short, particular backwards explanations are not successful 
because backwards explanations are, broadly speaking, unacceptable to us. Woodward’s 
 Further, practicing volcanologists seem only to make claims about the likelihood of  an eruption (of  1
a particular sort) over some time-frame (Fountain 2015). Their predictions seem to be sensitive to 
uncertainty about the future. It would then be appropriate to treat their explanations as being 
similarly sensitive, that is, as being given in terms of  the information they have and not the 
predictions they are making.
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discussion of  backwards explanation is a key part of  his argument against unificationism 
about scientific explanation. 
Kitcher (1989) posits that scientific explanations explain by unifying.  Scientific 2
explanations unify phenomena by showing how some of  them—the explananda—are 
derivable from the others. This derivation is the explanans. These derivations are explanatory 
when they adhere to a schematic form found in the culturally-specific explanatory store. For 
the derivation to be explanatory, the explanatory store must consist of  whatever set of  
schematic sentences can explain all the phenomena with a minimum of  derivation patterns, 
i.e., it must be maximally unified. For instance, because I can explain the dimensions of  any 
object by its origin and development but only some objects by the size of  their shadows, 
derivations of  sizes from shadows are non-explanatory, while origin and development 
derivations are.  3
Woodward (2003) wants to show that Kitcher’s view that causal judgements are 
parasitic upon and can be recreated from explanatory practices is false. Kitcher claims, in 
part, that causal judgements result from and track our explanatory practices. Woodward 
wishes to show the opposite, that causal judgements precede explanation and enable it. To 
show this, Woodward argues that Kitcher’s unificationism cannot recreate the time 
asymmetry we see in our explanatory practices, thus the time asymmetry that is evident in 
 Friedman (1974) first posited this view, but his version faced several objections—see Kitcher (1976) 2
for a discussion. Kitcher developed his version to fix some of  these problems.
 The D-N model, as found in e.g., Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), suffered from this derivation-of-3
dimensions-from-shadows problem. The problem was originated by Bromberger and is found in 
modified form elsewhere. See Salmon (1989: 47n12) for a discussion.
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our causal judgements must be primary or fundamental, meaning that causation is the more 
fundamental notion. 
To argue that the unificationist cannot recreate the time asymmetry of  our causal 
judgements from our explanatory practices (as described by unificationism), Woodward, 
following Barnes (1992), asks us to consider a closed system governed by laws indifferent to 
the direction of  time, a solar system governed by Newtonian mechanics.  Those laws, 4
Woodward stipulates, are time-direction indifferent: they can be used equally well, given a 
complete accounting of  one particular state of  the system as an input, to derive both later 
and earlier states of  the system. For this system, the predictive set of  derivations will be no 
more unifying than the retrodictive set of  derivations, so a maximally unified explanatory store 
could feature either on Kitcher’s account, Woodward claims.  
But, Woodward notes, we do not accept backwards explanations for this system. He 
says: 
However, we ordinarily think of  the predictive derivations and not the 
retrodictive derivations as explanatory and the present state of  the 
planets as the cause of  their future state and not vice-versa. (2003: 362)  
Here he is following Barnes, who says a bit more: 
The Newtonian Predictive Pattern is intuitively explanatory of  the 
members [of  the set of  statements describing the velocities and positions 
of  objects in the system].  A perfectly legitimate explanation of  the fact 
that some object has a particular position and velocity at some time 
would consist of  a citation of  the fact that the system containing the 
object had a particular state at some earlier time, together with the 
deterministic Newtonian laws that led inexorably from the latter to the 
former. However, the Newtonian Retrodictive Pattern is utterly 
 I follow the Woodward development of  this objection, and have modified the exposition to make 4
the case clearer, more consistent and simpler to explain. There are two ways of  interpreting the 
objection, and I address both of  them in turn.
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nonexplanatory of  the members of  [the set]; such explananda cannot in 
general be explained by citing facts that occurred subsequent to the 
explananda themselves. (1992: 565-6) 
Woodward and Barnes claim here that, in this case at least, predictions explain and 
retrodictions do not. No explicit argument is provided for the claim that the retrodictive 
pattern, applied to this system, is non-explanatory. Indeed, both authors have stipulated that 
the laws are sufficient in this system to produce accurate derivations of  any state from any 
other state. Because the laws are sufficient to accurately predict and retrodict ex hypothesi, it 
cannot be the case that the retrodictive pattern is non-explanatory because it is insufficient 
to produce accurate accountings of  the other states of  the system. What remains is its 
character as backwards explanation rather than forwards explanation: indeed, for the 
patterns to be equally unifying—and thus for the system to be apt for critiquing the 
unificationist—the only difference between the forwards and backwards explanations must 
be their direction. The reason the backwards explanations are non-explanatory, then, is 
because they are backwards explanations. Woodward and Barnes conclude that 
unificationism fails as a model for explanation, because this case shows that backwards 
explanations are unacceptable and unificationism does not exclude retrodictive patterns from 
the explanatory store. 
This objection is in need of  clarification along three dimensions. First, Woodward 
cannot be claiming that, in order to be explanatory, the explanandum needs to be in the 
future when the explanation is given and the explanans in the past. If  this were Woodward’s 
demand, then no prediction where both of  the events are in the past (or future) from the 
perspective of  evaluation would be explanatory, even if  the prediction preceded the event 
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predicted. But it seems like there are genuine cases of  explanation where both the act of  
prediction and the event predicted are now in the past from our perspective (e.g., predicting 
past eclipses before they occurred).  
Second, Woodward’s claim cannot be about ‘prediction’ and ‘retrodiction’ in the 
normal sense of  those words.  Taking two events that are already in the past when the 5
explanation is given and deriving the later one from the earlier one can be genuinely 
explanatory even though it is not a ‘prediction’ in the normal sense (e.g., explaining past 
eclipses by the positions of  celestial bodies leading up to them). 
This means that Woodward’s claim must be understood in terms of  a temporal 
sequence, then, and not in terms of  past and future; a predictive derivation, then, must be a 
derivation of  a later state based on some earlier state. Thus clarified, the claim is that when 
giving explanations, the event or state appealed to in the explanandum must be temporally 
prior to the event or state that constitutes part of  the explanans. Explanations of  the state 
of  the system at t0 must always be given in terms of  the state of  the system at t-n, never t+n. 
Woodward’s implicit claim is that (S1) is supposed to be explanatory, while (S2) is not: 
(S1) “Because bodies B have locations C and momenta M (i.e., the system is in state R) at 
t0 and the system is governed by laws L, they will have these other locations C1 and 
momenta M1 (i.e., the system will be in state S) later at t+1.” 
(S2) “Because bodies B have locations C and momenta M (i.e., the system is in state R) at 
t0 and the system is governed by laws L, they did have these other locations C-1 and 
momenta M-1 (i.e., the system was in state Q) earlier at t-1.” 
Woodward’s argument depends on the claim that, at least for this system, one state’s 
being temporally prior to another state gives it special explanatory status with respect to the 
 Modulo that I am not sure that ‘retrodiction’ has a ‘normal sense.’5
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later state; as such, prior states can serve as the basis for an explanation of  later states but 
later states do not serve as the explanatory base for prior states. 
One final point of  clarification is needed. Woodward’s exegesis—and, in following 
him, the exegesis I have given above—is ambiguous between two different arguments. The 
first way of  interpreting Woodward is as saying, of  our actual solar system, that it has certain 
features that should make it as amenable to derivations of  later states from prior ones as to 
prior states from later ones. That we do not in fact accept backwards explanations of  our 
actual solar system despite its amenability to them, then, should lead us to conclude that 
unificationism is faulty because it does not rule them out.  The second interpretation of  the 6
argument posits a hypothetical system with laws indifferent to the direction of  time and asks 
what our explanatory intuitions would be about that system. It then claims that because we 
would think backwards explanations unacceptable, even for this system that is maximally 
amenable to them, unificationism is incorrect because it does not rule them out.  
One way of  escaping the criticisms I will level at the first version of  the argument is 
to reformulate the objection in terms of  the second version of  the argument, so I will 
address them in this order, ultimately showing that they are both untenable. 
4. Actual World Interpretation of Woodward’s Argument 
The first version of  Woodward’s argument addresses the actual world, making the 
claim that we do not accept backwards explanations about certain actual world systems that 
would seem amenable to them. The argument runs like this: Consider our solar system as a 
 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for alerting me to this reading of  Woodward’s 6
concerns.
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closed, Newtonian system. Despite the fact that such systems are governed by laws 
indifferent to the direction of  time—that is, laws that can be used equally well to produce 
derivations of  future states from prior ones as to produce derivations of  prior states from 
future ones—observe that we accept only derivations of  later states from prior states as 
being explanatory. Because the laws are indifferent to the direction of  time, though, the 
forward-derivational pattern and the backwards-derivational pattern are equally unifying; 
thus unificationism cannot distinguish between them for this system. Because unificationism 
cannot rule out the use of  later states to explain prior ones for this actual world system and 
because our actual explanatory practices disallow such explanations, we should reject 
unificationism (as it cannot generate the requisite temporal asymmetry). Note that 
Woodward’s argument here does not depend on backwards explanations being in principle 
unacceptable, only the comparatively weaker claim that they are in fact not accepted for our 
solar system. 
In evaluating this objection, it should be noted that our actual solar system is neither 
closed nor Newtonian. That is, the energy/matter total within the system is not fixed 
(electromagnetic radiation, for instance, reaches us from outside the solar system). Nor is it 
the case that Newtonian laws are completely accurate in accounting for the positions and 
momenta of  the planets (consider, e.g., the precession of  the perihelion of  Mercury).  
So, what Woodward must mean by citing our actual solar system as an example of  a 
closed, Newtonian system governed by laws indifferent to the direction of  time is that it 
would seem that the positions and momenta of  planets in our actual solar system are 
amenable to characterization by and explanation with Newtonian laws indifferent to the 
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direction of  time (and that the energy transfer between the solar system and the universe at 
large is negligible for those purposes). Over historical time, our predictions and retrodictions 
remain empirically adequate despite the deviations of  the actual system from the 
idealizations being considered. 
For the actual solar system, characterized as such, we are able to perform both 
derivations of  later states from prior ones and prior states from later ones: the laws allow 
this because they are indifferent to the direction of  time. This is required for Woodward’s 
argument: for the two derivation patterns to be equally unifying, the laws must be equally 
accurate for both prior-to-later and later-to-prior derivations. Both patterns will be equally 
empirically adequate for this system considered as such. (That is, if  they vary from our 
observations, the predictive and retrodictive derivation patterns will vary equally much from 
those observations.) 
Woodward has claimed that we in fact accept only prior-to-later derivations as 
explanatory, despite the system’s amenability to both patterns. He concludes that 
unificationism is inadequate to capture the temporal asymmetry in our everyday explanatory 
practices. But unificationism can indeed make sense of  the fact that we, as we are currently 
situated, make use of  temporal information to rule out certain sorts of  explanations of  
actual world systems. This introduces the temporal asymmetry that Woodward seeks. 
To see why this is the case, first consider two ways in which a system might be 
considered to be time symmetric. First, a system that is time symmetric with respect of  laws has 
laws that work equally well to produce derivations of  later states from prior ones and vice 
versa. Second, a system that is time symmetric with respect of  phenomena exhibits no differences 
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in behavior when the time direction is reversed (and other corresponding changes made). 
That is, no observation could count in favor of  seeing time as appropriately oriented in one 
direction rather than the other. Consider an idealized, frictionless billiards table: there will be 
no grounds for selecting one time direction over the other for this system. 
The actual world is time symmetric in the first sense but not the second. That is, it is 
time symmetric with respect of  laws but not phenomena. The actual world exhibits a 
number of  apparently time-irreversible behaviors. The most obvious of  these are its 
entropic behaviors: the diffusion of  gasses, melting, friction, etc. These are all processes that 
require a set direction of  time for an adequate characterization. So while the system is 
governed by laws that are indifferent to the direction of  time, any adequate prediction or 
retrodiction involving these phenomena requires the introduction of  some auxiliary 
hypotheses (e.g., about boundary conditions) that include time-direction information.   
Even if  we know that the derivational patterns (including the auxiliary hypotheses) 
are equally empirically adequate, we also know that time direction information must figure 
into our predictions and retrodictions for phenomena in this world. Because they are equally 
empirically adequate, though, prior-to-later and later-to-prior derivation patterns (that appeal 
to time-direction information embedded in the auxiliary hypotheses) still appear to be 
equally unifying. 
But they are not, really: when we explain the actual world, we take advantage of  and 
draw on what we know about the actual world. Explaining phenomena in the actual world 
requires time direction information (because it is time asymmetric with respect of  
phenomena). Because we are meant to be explaining the actual world in this example, we 
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draw on our experiences of  that world—experiences which present it to us as being time 
asymmetric—in determining what explanatory patterns are appropriate or inappropriate. 
Note that this is how the argument must work. Unless Woodward is claiming that backwards 
explanations are in principle unacceptable—a claim I will examine shortly—there must be 
something about the system (that is, about the actual world) that makes it so that we do not 
accept backwards explanations about it. The unificationist should identify the most 
reasonable candidate for this feature as being that the actual world presents itself  to us as 
time asymmetric with respect of  phenomena. Because it presents itself  to us this way, this is 
the standard we use when evaluating it (despite the fact that the underlying laws themselves 
are time-direction indifferent). Unificationism would make the patterns of  forwards and 
backwards explanation equally adequate if  we considered the system as an idealization. But 
this is explicitly not the standard that we were asked to use; on this version of  the argument 
we were explicitly asked to consider the system as actual. As instructed, we judged it to the 
standard we use when we judge explanations about the actual world; that standard takes the 
world as we find it. 
Unificationism can give pride of  place to forwards explanations in this case because 
the system under consideration is an actual world system: when considering actual world 
systems, our experiences of  that world factor in to our decisions about which patterns of  
explanation to deploy. Our lived experience of  the actual world displays a sharp prior-to-later 
orientation; these experiences can be easily unified with each other and with accounts of  the 
system we are considering within an over-arching prior-to-later derivational scheme, but 
hardly at all within a scheme of  later-to-prior derivations. Considering the system as an 
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actual world system provides a new and vivid set of  phenomena for patterns of  explanation 
to accommodate, and a large proportion of  these new phenomena display the earlier-to-later 
asymmetry of  our everyday experience. Prior-to-later patterns will be more unifying overall 
when the system in question is to be explicitly considered as part of  an overarching system 
(the actual world) which includes this set of  time-asymmetric experiences within it. That the 
explanatory practices we actually have and use are rooted in the consideration of  phenomena 
as they appear to us (that is, as time asymmetric) and not the (time symmetric) laws should 
be no surprise. 
Woodward claimed that, for the system described in the actual world, unificationism 
could not claim prior-to-later derivational patterns as more unifying. But unificationism can 
generate temporal asymmetry by noting that, when considering the actual world, the 
derivational patterns must unify our experiences of  the (time asymmetric) phenomena within 
it as well. Predictive patterns will thus unify more completely than retrodictive ones. 
One way to escape these criticisms is to claim that our rejection of  backwards 
explanations for the actual world is really rooted in the unacceptability of  backwards 
explanations more generally. This would deny the unificationist’s appeal to our lived 
experience, but it would also require showing that our general explanatory intuitions never 
allow for backwards explanations. The second version of  Woodward’s argument attempts to 
do precisely this. 
5. Cases Show Backwards Explanation Sometimes Acceptable 
The other version of  Woodward’s argument considers our intuitions about a 
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hypothetical system, not an actual one. If  one took Woodward to claim that we should 
consider the system as an idealization or a hypothetical, the fact that the actual world is 
entropic (and otherwise time asymmetric) would not matter when we consider our 
explanatory intuitions about the system in question.  
Woodward pointed out that patterns of  explanation running from temporally later to 
temporally earlier are just as unified as those that run in the opposite direction for a closed 
system governed by time-direction indifferent deterministic laws. Unificationism does not 
disallow these backwards explanations, so, Woodward argues, because we think backwards 
explanations are problematic, unificationism is problematic. Woodward’s argument depends 
on the claim that backwards explanations are problematic when given about this system. 
Because, for this case, the ground of  the claim that backwards explanations are unacceptable 
cannot be that they are unacceptable for real systems, the ground would have to be that they 
are unacceptable generally. By considering the hypothetical and related cases more closely, I 
show that we should only rule out backwards explanations for systems that are not amenable 
to them. That is, I will argue that Woodward’s (illicit, too strong) rejection of  backwards 
explanation arises from the (weaker, reasonable) constraint on explanation that explanations 
must match the system they are about. 
To see that backwards explanations succeed for this system, when considered as 
hypothetical, suppose that we did not know the direction of  time in the system. This can be 
the case even though we do know the sequence of  the states of  the system; i.e., we know 
that state R comes between states Q and S, but we do not know whether Q is the earliest 
state in this sequence or if  S is the earliest. So we do not know if, moving from earliest to 
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latest, the states are Q-R-S or S-R-Q. Appeals to the states and the laws would seem to 
explain the system’s transitions between these states, even in the absence of  temporal 
priority information; that is, it seems that explanation is still possible in this system. Each of  
the other states of  the system can serve as the basis for an explanation of  R, as we are able 
to derive R from each of  the other states. This is inconsistent with Woodward’s claim of  
special explanatory status for states which are temporally prior: here we have no temporal 
priority, only temporal ordering. 
In order to make the example work, Woodward has allowed that explanations in 
terms or derivations of  states from other states via time indifferent laws in the presence of  
time direction information is explanatory. This case makes that last codicil seem unnecessary: 
for this system, where we do not have time direction information, explanation still seems 
possible. We can still tell a complete story (for this system) about how it develops from one 
stage to the next, and this is the essence of  explanation in both cases. This suggests that 
Woodward’s restriction of  explanation to prior-to-later explanations is inconsistent with our 
intuitions about explanation.  
A second way to see this inconsistency is to consider two systems with laws 
indifferent to the direction of  time. Suppose that the two systems are identical except for the 
direction of  time in that system. These systems will be mirrors of  each other along the 
temporal dimension. If  Woodward is right, pairs of  identical states will have opposite 
directions of  explanation. But this seems wrong: if  the laws really are indifferent to the 
direction of  time, then the fact that one state explains another in one of  these systems 
should suffice to show that it will explain it in the other as well. In this case, being temporally 
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prior does not seem to grant the special explanatory status that Woodward claims. These 
examples should be enough to show that the temporal asymmetry condition on explanation 
that Woodward advances is ungrounded. 
We might yet think that there is a fact of  the matter as to which state of  the system 
is earlier in the Q, R, S example, and that this will be discoverable by examining the other 
quantities in the system. This would allow us to determine which states are ‘really’ earlier, 
and so save the constraint. But if  the system is governed by time symmetric laws then the 
other quantities can be defined equally well given either assignment of  direction to time. 
Supposing that time has either direction cannot be superior to proposing the opposite 
assignment. ‘Earlier’ and ‘later’ have no ‘natural’ orientation in this system (unless we illicitly 
import some other information, e.g., by assimilating the boundary conditions of  this system 
to the boundary conditions of  our own world). The terms ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ will have no 
specification for this system unless we arbitrarily select an orientation for the time-like 
dimension. It is because derivations of  states from other states still seem explanatory in this 
system that prior/later relationships seem not to be relevant to the explanatory potential of  
any of  the stages of  the system. 
According to this version of  Woodward, no state of  the systems we are now 
considering could possibly be explanatory of  any other state unless we were to decide which 
direction we should take time to flow. To see that this is absurd, consider any two states of  
the system, A and B. Given one (arbitrarily selected) time orientation, A will be explanatory 
of  B because A will be earlier than B. On this orientation, B will not be—and could not be—
explanatory of  A. But on the other orientation, B will be explanatory of  A and A will not be
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—and could not be—explanatory of  B. Woodward would bar us from explaining any state of  
this system in terms of  any other because we lack temporal priority information (either 
because there is no such information or because we are in principle barred from accessing 
it). If  we were to explain in this system, we would have to decide which state of  the system 
to take as being earlier simply so that we can explain the ‘later’ states in terms of  the ‘earlier’ 
ones. It would seem better, in this case, to accept that each of  the states of  the system is 
equally explanatory of  each other state of  the system—and genuinely or successfully so—
regardless of  whether they are in or could be put in an earlier/later relationship. Woodward’s 
temporal asymmetry condition on explanation should be rejected.  
6. Hypothetical Case Shows An Explanation Must Match Its System 
Yet, as the discussion above shows, we are loathe to accept explanations of  prior 
states in terms of  later ones when they are given about the world we actually live in. This 
should not be surprising, though: we take it that the direction of  time matters for the world 
we actually live in (unlike the hypothetical system we were asked to evaluate in the second 
version of  the argument). The explanations we offer and accept in common practice are 
time asymmetric for just this reason: because we take the world to be time asymmetric, our 
explanatory schema are time asymmetric as well. 
The proper constraint on explanation is not one that disallows backwards 
explanations tout court. Instead, it is one that demands that explanations be time asymmetric 
because, in common practice, we take it that the world they are about is time asymmetric. Woodward has 
taken a defeasible, common-sense constraint on the explanandum (that the system to be 
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explained is time asymmetric) and confused it for an indefeasible constraint on the explanans 
(that it be incompatible with time symmetry). This is possible—and indeed understandable—
once we see the related, real constraint on the explanans: that the nature of  the explanation 
must match the nature of  the system being explained. 
This constraint should look familiar; it is the same constraint that played a motivating 
role in Section 2 above, and it is implicitly at work in Section 4. So let’s return to non-
scientific explanation for a moment. When I give an explanation of  why I am tidying my flat 
in terms of  my brother’s future visit, my successful explanation is given in terms of  
psychological states. When I explain the pimpernel’s closing by appealing to psychological 
states, my explanation seems problematic. That is because we take it that I actually do have 
psychological states, unlike the pimpernel. I am a system that is apt to psychological 
explanation in a way that the pimpernel is not. The explanations need to match the system 
about which they are given in order to be successful. In the first case, this is accomplished by 
appealing to psychological states; in the second case it is done by not appealing to 
psychological states. The nature of  the successful explanation tracks the sort of  system being 
explained. When we take certain sorts of  systems (the actual solar system, the pimpernel, 
me) to have certain sorts of  features (being time asymmetric with respect of  phenomena, 
being non-intentional, being intentional), the explanations given about those systems need to 
respect that those systems have those features. An explanation should be consistent with 
those sorts of  systems having those sorts of  features. This is what it means for an 
explanation to ‘match’ the system that it is about. 
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This new constraint—that explanations match the system about which they are given
—shows why backwards explanations are both uncommon but genuinely successful in some 
cases. Backwards explanations are genuinely successful in some cases because some systems 
really are time-direction indifferent, that is, they are time symmetric in both senses given 
above. But we rarely give and accept backwards explanations because we rarely are explaining 
systems that we believe to be time-direction indifferent. The two questions of  backwards 
explanation—do we give them, and are they ever successful—are thus best answered ‘not 
really’ and ‘yes,’ respectively.  7
This analysis counts in favor of  unificationism. Unificationism allows that if  the 
world turns out to be time asymmetric, explanations of  the world ought to be time 
asymmetric, too. Whatever way the world is, the explanations aimed at it ought to match the way 
that it is; this is not a revision to our common sense view of  explanation, it is our common 
sense view. Unificationism allows us to accept backwards explanations for systems that really 
are time symmetric (in both senses), but to reject them in day-to-day cases of  pimpernels 
and volcanos. There is nothing about unificationism that suggests that the explanatory store 
of  a time asymmetric world ought to be populated with time symmetric explanatory frames 
that would fail in many application conditions. If  the world turns out to be amenable to 
characterization with time symmetric resources, then the explanations aimed at that world 
 One might worry that the ‘backwards’ in ‘backwards explanation’ makes no sense for a system that 7
is time-direction indifferent, thinking that all explanations will be in some sense a-temporal and 
therefore not ‘backwards.’ This is not so, though: there can be time-direction indifferent systems that 
do indeed have a set direction of  time, it will just be the case that the direction of  time will not figure 
in explanations for that system. It is true that their ‘backwardness’ does not make these explanations 
as interesting in a time-direction indifferent system as they would be in a temporally asymmetric 
system, but they would still comprise a distinguishable class of  successful explanation.
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ought to evince that same time symmetry. Unificationism allows for the common-sense 
criterion that the explanation must match the system to be explained and can accommodate 
either of  these scientific results. These are major virtues of  unificationism. 
7. Causation and Conclusion 
One final point. As noted above, Woodward’s attack on Kitcher and unificationism 
arises from a discussion of  causation. Woodward’s concern is to refute Kitcher’s claim that 
causal judgements can be cashed out in terms of  explanatory judgements. Woodward says: 
[Kitcher’s] claim is that our ordinary judgments about causal asymmetries 
can be derived from the unificationist account. The example just 
described casts doubt on this claim. More generally, it casts doubt on 
Kitcher’s contention that one can begin with the notion of  explanatory 
unification, understood in a way that does not presuppose causal notions, 
and use it to derive the content of  causal judgments. (2003: 362) 
Woodward is right that the unificationist can only make causal judgements time 
asymmetric by making explanations time asymmetric as well, precisely because the 
unificationist seeks to produce causal judgements from explanatory ones. As we saw above, 
the unificationist can produce explanatory time asymmetry for the actual world by noting 
that our explanations of  the actual world must be unified with our experiences of  the 
phenomena in it and that those experiences take the phenomena to be time asymmetric. 
Unificationism is thus well-situated to explain our common sense judgements about 
causation. Because the explanations we actually give and actually accept presuppose time 
asymmetry, so too will our causal judgements. Our explanatory store only countenances 
explanatory patterns for this world that run from earlier to later, so, causal judgements based 
on those explanations will evince a similar time asymmetry. The unificationist can parse 
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causal judgements entirely in terms of  explanation and yet still retain the temporal 
asymmetry that Woodward sees as required for explanations of  and causal judgements about 
this world. Unificationism is strongly consistent with the intuition that explanations must 
match the system that they are about, and once we have that constraint, unificationism is 
well-positioned to show how causal judgements are generated from explanations not just for 
this world but more generally. 
Understanding backwards explanation has consequences for our understanding of  
scientific explanation generally and, more specifically, for the status of  unificationism. It also 
has consequences for how we think about causation. Here I have shown that while 
backwards explanations are not (usually) in fact given and accepted about the world we live 
in, we should still take it that they could be successful (for certain sorts of  system). For the 
reasons outlined above, this shows that unificationism is still a viable candidate for a theory 
of  scientific explanation and can, perhaps, even explain how we come to make the causal 
judgements that we do. 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